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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

The Sierra Club's final argument questioned the Corps compliance
with NEPA. Federal agencies are required to perform an EA to determine if a broader, more detailed Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") is required. After the Corps' completed the EA, it issued a
FONSI and therefore was not required to perform an EIS. For an
agency to reach a FONSI, NEPA requires that agency to take a "hard
look" at the evidence to satisfy the process. However, United States
Supreme Court precedent indicates a court must be "highly deferential" regarding technical or scientific evidence. The Sierra Club questioned the agency's "hard look," their FONSI determination, and
whether the Corps had completed the appropriate alternatives analysis.
The court held the Corps had satisfied each claim.
The court looked at the 4500 pages of record and held that the
Corps did not need NEPA to "remind it to take a hard look at the impacts of its actions." It already had. Regarding the FONSI determination, the Corps admitted to relying on mitigation measures. The court
held mitigation measures must be "more than a possibility." They must
"constitute an adequate buffer so as to render such impacts so minor as
to not warrant an EIS." The court held that the science supported
both the mitigation and the special conditions attached to the permit.
Finally, regarding the Corps' search for alternatives, the court held the
Corps had detailed a no action alternative and individual permitting
alternative in its EA. The court held the Sierra Club's argument inadequate because it lacked a genuine discussion, only "summarily dismisses" the Corps' work, and had no suggestions of its own. Further,
an EA requires a lower standard of alternatives discussion than an EIS.
In addition to holding in favor of the Corps on all of the Sierra
Club's claims, the court also vacated the preliminary injunction. The
court ended by holding the Corps' issuance of the permit, "is at, but
not beyond, the outer limits of that authority."
Zackary Smith
Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 426 F. Supp. 2d 612 (W.D. Ky.
2006) (holding that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
when it approved the procedures providing administrative and judicial
review under Kentucky's permitting process and that Kentucky's
antidegradation procedures meet the requirements of the CWA).
Kentucky Waterways Alliance ("Waterways") sought summary judgment against United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA");
Waterways asserted that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when it approved Kentucky's Tier II Antidegradation Rules and did not
ensure the protection of existing "high quality" water as required by
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). States establish their own methods for
identifying which waters in its boundaries require Tier II protection
and the EPA may give final approval to the chosen method. When a
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state permits new pollutants or discharges into Tier II waters, the state
must determine that reducing the water quality is required to accommodate economic or social development. The entity discharging pollutants must receive a permit from a state agency to discharge into Tier
II waters unless the release of the pollutant is de minimis. The issues
before the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky were: (1) whether the EPA's approval of Kentucky's antidegradation procedure was consistent with the requirements of the CWA; and
(2) whether the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it approved Kentucky's procedures.
The court addressed eleven matters concerning Kentucky Tier II
antidegradation procedures to determine whether the EPA's decisions
were arbitrary and capricious. First, the court addressed the EPA's determination that discharges with increased pollutant loadings of less
than twenty percent would not significantly degrade water quality.
Kentucky regulations did not require an antidegradation review for
Kentucky Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("KPDES") permit
renewals and modifications that caused less than a twenty percent increase in pollutant loading from the formerly allowable pollutant loading. The court held that a comprehensive review of the Kentucky
permit program's history and its possible impact on receiving waters
performed by the EPA demonstrated that the provision would have
resulted in no more than a de minimis discharge and consequently
would not require a Tier II review.
Waterways requested the court assess the EPA's determination that
the default limits for domestic sewage discharges did not considerably
degrade the water quality. Kentucky's antidegradation implementation procedures provided that permits for new or expanded domestic
sewage discharges that had restrictions as strict as the limitations provided in the CWA Tier II regulations were not required to undergo a
Tier II antidegradation review. The court held that, when the EPA
looked at past statistics and measured water levels, it was justified in
determining that the procedures set by the KPDES permitting system
would achieve the CWA's objective without requiring a Tier II antidegradation review.
The court then examined the EPA's determination that discharges
at a default level of one-half of otherwise permissible quality-based restrictions were not likely to cause significant water quality degradation.
Kentucky regulations permitted new or expanding non-domestic dischargers to high quality water to accept KPDES permit restrictions that
were no more than one-half of the water quality-based limitations that
standard design conditions allowed for. The court held that the EPA's
analysis of the historical KPDES permits, flow records, and conditions
justified the conclusion that the fifty-percent provision would not have
resulted in any reduction of the water quality or in a significant degradation of high quality waters. Additionally, discharges which met the
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restrictions would likely not had greater than a de minimis impact on
water quality because the fifty-percent provision would have imposed
more stringent limits than currently in place.
The court assessed the EPA's determination that a publicly owned
treatment works subject to a regional plan did not require Tier II
antidegradation analysis. Kentucky's antidegradation policy stated that
an approval of a publicly owned treatment works regional facility plan
met the requirements for an antidegradation review. The court held
the proposed plant approvals met the CWA's standards because they
were equivalent to antidegradation review.
The court analyzed the EPA's determination that the process for
the issuance of storm water general permits sufficiently dealt with
antidegradation concerns. Kentucky's implementation procedures
stated that discharges subject to KPDES storm water general permits
were not subject to Tier II antidegradation review. The court agreed
with the EPA that the public participation process was satisfied through
a general permit issuance and the EPA's recognition of Kentucky's
right to exercise discretion addressed the socioeconomic accommodations. Additionally, under the general permit any potential storm water discharges would have been a de minimis reduction of water quality
and would not have required a Tier II review.
Waterways asked the court to examine the EPA's determination
that, under Kentucky regulations, discharges associated with coal mining received a Tier II antidegradation review consistent with the requirements of the CWA. Under Kentucky antidegradation regulations,
coal-mining discharges were subject to regulation under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, and were not subject to Tier II
regulation. The court agreed with the EPA that the findings indicated
that the existing programs under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act had a decision-making process with Tier II review and with
the CWA.
The court considered the EPA's determination that Kentucky's
recognized process for permitting domestic sewage from single-family
residences was consistent with the CWA. Kentucky regulations stated
that Tier II review was not compulsory for domestic sewage discharges
from single-family dwellings. The EPA argued, and the court agreed,
that the Kentucky permit process was consistent with the CWA because
the established process fulfilled the requirements by allowing public
involvement in addition to a socioeconomic accommodation study,
and was consistent with the general purpose of the CWA to retain high
quality water levels.
The court then assessed the EPA's determination that concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFO") do not need antidegradation review. Kentucky regulations stated that CAFO discharges were
not subject to Tier II review because permits regulated the CAFO facilities and allowed absolutely no discharges apart from those that may
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have arose from considerable rainfall. The court held that non-point
discharges were not subject to antidegradation review as they were not
subject to federal regulation but were a matter for the states. In addition, the infrequency of precipitation in connection with the fact that
the regulation prohibited all other discharges demonstrated that
CAFO sources would have no more than a de minimis effect on water
quality.
The court examined the EPA's approval of Kentucky's choice not
to include impaired waters in its Tier II classification. The court held
that case law recognized the use of a water body-specific approach, as
over ninety percent of Kentucky waters received Tier II or III protection using this approach. The court also held that the EPA correctly
examined the impact of a water body-specific approach and found it to
be consistent with EPA requirements supporting water levels necessary
to sustain fish, shellfish, and wildlife.
Waterways asked the court to assess the EPA's determination that
the Kentucky regulations contained adequate implementation procedures. The court held that the EPA was correct in arguing that antidegradation regulations applied to discharges involving KPDES permit
review and they provided permit applicant guidelines for the state to
follow.
The court then considered the EPA's approval of Kentucky's
KPDES permit implementation procedures, even though the procedures did not address CWA Section 401 water quality certifications.
The EPA answered, and the court agreed, that this claim had no merit
because a procedure to issue 401 certifications already existed in Kentucky.
The court held that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
when it approved the procedures providing administrative and judicial
review under Kentucky's permitting process.
Kathleen Brady
UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT
Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, No. 04541L, 2007 WL
548819 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 20, 2007) (holding that (1) individual water users were not third-party beneficiaries of water allocation contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and the irrigation districts; (2) the
shortage provision in the contracts excused non-performance of water
allocations; (3) conservative operation of the New Melones Dam was
not unreasonable and did not breach the contract; (4) the alteration of
the contractual obligations due to recent legislation was not a taking).
This case arose from a water allocation and distribution dispute in
the Central Valley Basin ("Basin") of California regarding water from
the New Melones Dam. The dam is part of a federal water conserva-

